Russia imports over $1B in strategic minerals for military use, with China as top supplier

Russia spent over $1.1 billion importing strategic minerals for its military-industrial complex in a single year, according to a report by the Economic Security Council of Ukraine (ESCU). The findings cover April 2024 through March 2025 and paint a picture of a country that, despite sitting on vast natural resources, can’t process them fast enough to keep its weapons production lines running.

China is doing most of the heavy lifting. Beijing supplied the lion’s share of critical materials, including alumina, tungsten, tantalum, and niobium, all essential ingredients for producing missiles and military aircraft. The report positions these imports as a structural vulnerability that Western sanctions have so far failed to fully exploit.

The numbers behind Russia’s mineral dependency

The single largest line item is alumina, the refined form of bauxite used to produce aluminum. Russia imported 1.6 million tonnes of alumina from China alone, worth roughly $1 billion. That figure represented 31.5% of Russia’s total mineral import value during the analyzed period.

Ireland, perhaps surprisingly, ranked as another major alumina supplier. Irish exports to Russia totaled 960,350 tonnes valued at $567.68 million, accounting for approximately 17% of total mineral imports.

Tungsten imports, critical for armor-piercing munitions and high-temperature aircraft components, came almost entirely from one source. Of $9.8 million in tungsten purchases, 97% originated in China.

Niobium, used to strengthen steel alloys in jet engines and missile bodies, saw $64 million in imports. China again dominated at 58% of supply. Brazil contributed $33 million in ferroniobium (about 30% of that sub-category), while Canada chipped in $12.8 million worth, representing 11.7%.

Central Asian and Caucasus nations filled other gaps. Kazakhstan supplied 76% of Russia’s beryllium imports and 69% of its tantalum. Armenia provided 2,058 tonnes of molybdenum products valued at $65.25 million. Even Uzbekistan made an appearance, exporting 3.95 tonnes of rhenium, a rare metal used in jet engine superalloys, for $2.3 million.

These minerals aren’t decorative. The ESCU report specifically ties them to weapons systems including Iskander ballistic missiles and various aircraft engines that Russia is actively deploying in Ukraine.

Why Russia can’t just dig its own minerals

The ESCU assessment found that most domestic extraction and processing projects announced after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 will not reach operational capacity until at least 2035.

This creates what amounts to a structural chokepoint. Russia’s ability to manufacture advanced weapons systems depends on foreign suppliers who could, in theory, be pressured to cut off the flow. The ESCU report makes exactly this argument: comprehensive sanctions targeting the entire supply chain could worsen weapon shortages and potentially serve as leverage toward a ceasefire.

The sanctions gap and what it means

China’s role is the elephant in the room. Beijing has consistently positioned itself as neutral in the conflict while maintaining and expanding trade ties with Moscow. Alumina and tungsten shipments worth over $1 billion in a single year suggest that neutrality looks a lot like active supply.

Ireland’s $567.68 million contribution is also notable. As an EU member state subject to European sanctions on Russia, the alumina trade raises questions about how these materials are classified and whether existing restrictions contain the right loopholes, or the wrong ones.

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