The International Atomic Energy Agency confirmed on September 10, 2026, that satellite imagery shows ongoing construction and movement at Iran’s Pickaxe Mountain facility, a deeply buried site adjacent to the country’s main uranium enrichment complex at Natanz. The confirmation landed one day after a detailed analysis by the Center for Strategic and International Studies documented road traffic and structural work at the site running well above any previously recorded levels.
The IAEA Board of Governors simultaneously referred Iran’s nuclear dossier to the UN Security Council for non-compliance, the first such referral in roughly two decades.
What the satellite images show, and what they don’t
IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi described indicators of activity at the site but was careful to note a hard limit on what the agency actually knows. No inspector has ever set foot inside Pickaxe Mountain’s underground tunnels, despite repeated requests from the agency.
Remote imagery can confirm trucks, freshly poured concrete, and expanded road networks. It cannot confirm what is being built, stored, or processed more than 100 meters underground.
The CSIS analysis, published September 9, 2026, found that the scale of recent construction activity at the site surpassed anything observed in prior years. Road traffic volume and structural enhancements both registered at unprecedented levels by the organization’s measurement.
Pickaxe Mountain sits between 1.5 and 2 kilometers south of the Natanz enrichment facility. Construction at Pickaxe Mountain began in the fall of 2020, shortly after reported sabotage incidents damaged infrastructure at Natanz.
Iran’s explanation versus Western concerns
Iranian authorities have described the site as a location for producing and assembling advanced centrifuges. Western intelligence agencies have raised concerns that a facility built more than 100 meters underground, positioned next to a known enrichment complex, and deliberately shielded from international inspection is a more plausible candidate for secure storage of nuclear materials or covert enrichment activity.
The IAEA has sought access to the site without result since at least mid-2025. The agency’s last confirmed inspection access predates that period, meaning inspectors have had no verified look inside the tunnels for over a year at minimum.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and Iran’s safeguards agreement with the IAEA require Tehran to grant inspectors access to declared and, in some cases, undeclared facilities. Denying access is itself a compliance issue, separate from whatever is actually happening underground.
The Security Council referral and what comes next
The Board of Governors’ decision to refer Iran’s nuclear file to the Security Council carries real diplomatic weight, even if the Council’s track record on Iran enforcement is complicated by the veto power held by Russia and China. The last time the Board took this step was approximately two decades ago, before the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the nuclear deal that briefly brought Iran’s enrichment activity under tighter controls before the US withdrew in 2018.
Grossi’s public confirmation of activity at Pickaxe Mountain on the same day as the referral suggests the agency is coordinating its disclosures carefully. Releasing satellite-confirmed evidence of heightened construction while simultaneously escalating to the Security Council puts diplomatic pressure on Tehran to either explain the site’s purpose or grant the access it has so far refused.
Disclosure: This article was edited by Editorial Team. For more information on how we create and review content, see our Editorial Policy.

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